Al-Kindi begins his discussion in
Kindi's modern-day commentator Alfred Ivry, "thought with no mediation," that is, "as intellectual intuitions, free of prior logical, as well as physical, mediation."6 Letting '>' stand for "is greater than", '<' for "is smaller than", and '=' for "is equal to", Al-Kindi's six self-evident first principles can be conveniently summarized as follows:
( A word of explanation should be said concerning the terms used in these principles. With regard to the term 'body', it seems clear that al-Kindi here employs 'body' to denote thisor that body; that is, certain particular bodies, primarysubstancesin the Aristotelian sense.7 This is borne out by the fact (Here 'A' and 'B' standforparticular bodies, and '>' represents the 'greaterthan'relation.) It will benoticed that theconclusion -i.e., (x)-appears in transposed form in step(iv); the argument is circular. But this does not mean that is question-begging, any more than the Law of Non-Contradiction is question-begging because at some pointin anyargument for its truth that very law will be invoked.
6 Ibid.
7Recall that for Aristotle aprimary substance isthat 'which isneither asserted ofa subject nor presentin a subject' (e.g., thisman or this horse). SeeAristotle, Categories, 2.a. 12-15.
We must becareful topoint out, however, that al-Kindi also uses 'body'torefer tothegenus 15 It is perhaps worth pointing out that none ofthe continuous magnitudes of body, area, line, place, or time is divisible in potentiality or actuality into another species. Thus, for example,a divisionof a bodyis body(157.10), andeachsectionof a body"bears itsdefinition and its name" (Ibid., 157.18, p. 109). will be either finite or infinite. But it cannot be finite. For if the finite (separated) body is added back to the remainder, the resulting body will be finite. Why so, exactly? Principle (5) states that when two bodies of finite magnitude are joined, the resulting body will also be finite in magnitude. In this case, however, the body formed from adding back the finite (separated) body to the remainder constitutes the same body from which the original separation was made -that is, the body of infinite magnitude. Thus, the resulting body is both finite and infinite in magnitude. And this contradicts principle (3) -thefinite is not the infinite -which is just a substitution instance of A is not non-A. So the body remaining after the separation of a finite magnitude cannot be finite.
Perhaps an example will be helpful in bringing al-Kindi's reasoning into clearer focus. Let AB be a body of infinite magnitude. Suppose, then, that A, a body of finite magnitude, is separated from AB. The resulting body B cannot be finite. For suppose that it were. Then, by principle (5), the addition of A (a finite body) to B (also a finite body) could only yield the finite body AB. But this contradicts the original assumption that AB is a body of infinite magnitude. Hence, it is impossible that B, the body resulting from the separation, be finite.
Is it possible, on the other hand, for B to be infinite? It is not, says alKindi. For suppose that it were infinite. Then the finite (separated) body A, when added back to B, would result in a body (AB)' such that either (AB)' would be greater than the original (infinite) body AB or (AB)' would be equal to body AB. But the former alternative is clearly false, since if it were true that (AB)' > AB, then one infinite body would be greater than the other. By principle (6), therefore, the smaller infinite AB would be inferior to the greater infinite (AB)' or to a portion of it. Thus, AB would be equal to a portion of (AB)'. If so, however, then AB would be finite; for it would be equal to a finite portion of (AB)' and, according to principle (2), equal bodies possess limits whose dimensions are equal in actuality and potentiality. But this contradicts the original supposition that AB is a body of infinite magnitude; it is false, therefore, that (AB)' > AB.
But the second disjunct is also false, namely, that (AB)' = AB. Recall that the separation of finite body A from an infinite magnitude AB is an initial assumption of the argument. It is further being supposed that the remaining body B is infinite in magnitude, and that (AB)' is the body resulting from the addition of A (a finite body) and B (an infinite body). To claim that (AB)' = AB, therefore, is to assert that a body can be added to another body without increasing it. But this is contradictory; for it implies that the whole (i.e., AB)' is equal to one of its parts (i.e., B).Î f sound, what al-Kindi's argument demonstrates is that no body of infinitemagnitudecan exist. For if there werea bodyof infinitemagnitude, then if a body of finite magnitude were separated from it (and magnitudes are necessarily separable into their parts), then the remaining body would be either finite (alternative #1) or infinite (alternative #2). Both of these alternatives lead to contradiction. Therefore,it can be legitimatelyinferred that no body of infinite magnitude can exist.
IV.
Before proceeding with al-Kindi's argument further, it will be useful to pause and examine an objection to his reasoning arising from modern set theory. In arguing against alternative #1, al-Kindi must suppose that the subtraction of a finite body from a body of infinite magnitude yields a finite remainder. This is a false supposition according to the deliverances of modern set theory. Axiomatic set theory states that an actually infinite magnitudecomprisesa set whosemembers are actually infinite in number. The symbol So (aleph nought) denotes the cardinality or number of members of an actually infinite set. Now a peculiar property of infinite sets is that "one can add or subtract denumerably many members from [theml andnotchangethenumberof members in theset."17 Foranyactually infinite set, therefore, So -n = So and So + n = So (where n is any natural number).1» It is therefore a mistake to claim, as al-Kindi does in arguing against alternative #2, that it is impossible to add to a bodily magnitude withoutincreasingit. For this is to supposethat Euclid's Maxim -the whole is greaterthan itspart -appliesto infinitemagnitudes; it does not. Concerning Euclid's Maxim, F.A. Shamsi comments: 16 Craig points out that al-Kindi refutes the second disjunct, not by appealing to principle (4), but rather by "utilising a principle that should have been added to his six: the whole is greater than [its] part" (Craig, Plato toLeibniz, p. 69). This principle, also known as Euclid's Maxim,can be deriveddirectlyfromprinciples(2), (4), and (6), and indirectlyfrom principle Insofar as finite magnitudes are concerned, the postulate is true of them -the (proper) part must necessarily be less in magnitude than the whole. But the postulate fails when infinite magnitudes are taken into consideration... it is obvious that a finite subtraction from an infinite aggregation or magnitude cannot render that aggregation or magnitude finite.19
Here Shamsi is exploiting a second unique property of an infinite set, namely, that it has a denumerable subset (where a set is denumerable just in case it can be put into a one-to-one correspondence with one of its proper subsets). Consider, for example, two infinite sets:20 the set of all natural numbers {1,2,3,...} and the set of all even natural numbers {2,4,6,...}. Since these two sets are actually infinite, the members of {1,2,3...} can be placed in a one-to-one correspondence with the members of {2,4,6,...}. Yet although the set of even natural numbers is a part of the set of natural numbers, they both have, according to infinite set theory, a cardinality of So. Therefore, if the Principle of Correspondence validly applies to infinite sets, it follows that part of the set of natural numbers is equivalent to the whole set of natural numbers, a conclusion obviously at odds with Euclid's Maxim.
There is, therefore, a dilemma to be faced: If there were a body of infinite magnitude, then either the maxim that "the whole is greater than its parts" would apply to it or not. Now if the maxim applies, then al-Kindi's reasoning is vindicated, from which it follows that no infinite magnitude can exist. If, on the other hand, it does not apply (the Principle of Correspondence applying instead), then a body of infinite magnitude possibly exists, in which case al-Kindi's argument fails.
But is there any reasonto think that the Principleof Correspondence is Al-Kindi next attempts to show that the universe is both spatially and temporally finite. It is a necessary truth that body falls under the genus of magnitude. Furthermore, any magnitude is necessarily separable into its parts. But, by definition, whatever is necessarily separable into its parts is quantitative. So body is necessarily quantitative. Moreover, if, as al-Kindi argues, it is impossible that a body of infinite magnitude should exist (see section III above), then letting 'Q' stand for "is quantitative", T for "is infinite", and 'b' for "body", it follows that This may be granted. But how does al-Kindi propose to bridge the gap between (8) and the claim that the universe is temporally finite? Here he But the problem is that the inference from (8) to (9) The difficulty, then, is that from the fact that time is quantitative it follows that time is finite only if something like (9) is true. Unfortunately, al-Kindi never provides an argument for (9); he argues only for (8), which does not entail (9).
Secondly,al-Kindi points out that since an actually infinite body cannot exist, the body of the universe cannot be infinite. But, he says, Things predicated of a finite object are also of necessity, finite. Every predicate of a body, whether quantity, place, motion or time ... and the sum of everything which is predicated of a body in actuality, is also finite, since the body is finite.2* For al-Kindi, time is the durationof the body of the universe, and the body of the universe is finite; therefore, time is finite.
But the question at once arises: How can it be shown that time is the duration of the body of the universe? Al-Kindi's argument shows that the bodyof the universe is temporally finiteonly if bodyand time are necessary concomitants -only if, that is, • (B = T). How is this to be proved? Well, since time is the "number of motion,"24 motion and time are necessary 
motion and body were necessary concomitants as well, it could easily be shown that • (B s T).This is precisely what al-Kindi attempts to do. He first argues that motion can never existwithout abody, that is, that~0 (M &~B), orequivalently, • (M z> B). Motion is a species of change

Al-Kindi goes onto argue that • (B d M). Here two major arguments are advanced. Regarding the first, William Craig remarks that it is"poorly reasoned."26 One is inclined to agree with him onthis point. According to al-Kindi, body is necessarily such that if it exists, then either motion exists or motion does not exist. That is, (10)
• [B z> (M v~M) ].
But it is obvious from sense perception that bodies exist.27 Hence, ( 
11) • [(B & M) v (B &~M)].
The first disjunct in (11) therefore, that~M &~0 M implies that motion existsand motion does not exist; thus, the first disjunct of (12) is necessarily false. Unfortunately, there are two major defects in this proof. First, it appears that al-Kindi has begged the question at issue. It will be recalled that Kindi has already shown that • (M z> B). Now he is in the midst of a proof that will establish that • (B zj M), his ultimate goal being to show that body and motion are necessary concomitants. Thus, Kindi cannot assume B Z)M in order to argue against the first disjunct of (12). This is question-begging, since (12) is itself a premise in the argument being advanced in support of the truth of Q(B=>M).
Secondly, the inference of (11) from (10) and the proposition bodies exist is modally invalid; for bodies exist is only contingently (and not necessarily) true. If it were necessarily true, then the universe would be eternal, a conclusion obviously at odds with al-Kindi's philosophy. And if it were only contingently true that bodies exist, then it would follow that (B & M) v (B &~M) was only contingently true as well. This is somewhat problematic. For then even if al-Kindi were able to show that B &~M was necessarily false, he would only be able to conclude that B & M was contingently true. But then B 3 M could only be contingently true, leaving open the possibility that B &~M. Thus, even if motion and time were necessary concomitants, it would still be possible that body and time were not. On this scenario, then, even if it were impossible for the universe to be spatially finite, it would still be possible for it to be temporally infinite. Though not devastating to al-Kindi's argument, this finding does contradict his claim that motion and body are necessary concomitants.
In any event, al-Kindi goes on with a refutation of the second disjunct of (12). That disjunct says that as a matter of fact motion does not exist, but nevertheless that it is possible that it does exist in some body. In order to show that~M & 0 M is contradictory, Al-Kindi now reasonsthat if a body exists and motion possibly exists in some body, then "motion necessarily exists in some bodies."2^But why so? "That which is possible," he contends, "is that which [actually] exists in some possessors of its substance."30 Thus, for example, the art of writing is a possibility (though not an actuality) for the Prophet because it (does) exist in some other man. In commenting on this passage, Ivry points out that al-Kindi accepts "the priority of actuality 29Ibid., 118.4, p. 71. 30 And (11) and (13) jointly entail (14) • (B 3 M) which is what al-Kindi set out to prove. The second major argument advanced for the conclusion that body cannot exist without motion is couched in an objection entertained by alKindi. Perhaps the body of the universe was originally at rest (from eternity) and then, since it had the possibility of motion, subsequently began to move. If sound, this objection would undercut creatio ex nihilo; for the body of the universe would then be eternal and would never have begun to exist.34 Suppose that this is indeed the case, says al-Kindi; that is, suppose the universe was eternally at rest but then subsequently moved. Then the body of the universe would either have been generated from nothing or it would be eternal. If the former alternative is true, then the very generation of the body of the universe would be a motion, since generation is a species of motion.35Accordingly, at no time t would the body of the universe be found to be existing without motion; hence, it would not be the case that body precedes motion. By hypothesis, however, body does precede motion. Hence, body both precedes and does not precede motion. Consequently, even if the body of the universe were generated from nothing, body would not precede motion.
There is, I think, one serious problem with this argument; it assumes that the generation of the body of the universe is a motion, a species of change. But is this really the case? I do not think so. To begin with, change is always change from a prior state to a later state; al-Kindi has already established that motion (change) and time are necessary concomitants, so that motion (change) entails the existence of temporally prior states. Furthermore, change is always the change (over time) of some thing. This is evident from al-Kindi's observation that if motion exists, body exists. Now the creation (generation) of the body of the universe out of nothing implies two things: (i) there is no timeprior to creation,3^and (ii) no bodies existpriortocreation. Butif,asal-Kindi claims, thegeneration of thebody of theuniverse isa motion orchange, then there is (ofnecessity) both time and body prior to creation. Thus, al-Kindi's argument here is doubly contradictory; it is false, therefore, that the generation of the body of the universe is a motion.
Regarding thesecond alternative, namely, thesupposition thatthebody of the universe is eternal, al-Kindi contends that if this were the case and the body of the universe were to subsequently move (because it had the possibility of motion), then it would be a movement from a state of actual rest to a state of actual motion. This is a change.37 But the eternal cannot change; change isa movement from deficiency toperfection, butthe eternal is necessarily perfect, and that which isperfect exists in a fully actual state "whereby it excels."38 Accordingly, the eternal does not move. But, by hypothesis, the bodyof the universe is eternal anddoesmove. The eternal, therefore, both moves and does not move. Again, this iscontradictory. Hence, it follows that body cannot exist without motion.
The upshot ofall this isthat al-Kindi has provided two major arguments fortheconclusion thatit is necessary thatif body exists, motion exists. As mentioned earlier, this isa critical premise inhis overall argument. Having established that Q(MdB) and now that • (B z> M), al-Kindi can justifiably assert that • (B = M), that body and motion are necessary concomitants. Nowgiventhatmotion andtimearealsonecessary concomitants, it follows logically and inescapably thatbody and time are necessary concomitants: • (B=T). Recall that al-Kindi's proof forcreation began with anargument for the finitude of the body of the universe. Furthermore, the claim was made that time is the duration of the body of the universe, and therefore that if the body of the universe is finite, time is finite as well. It was noted thatthis would betrueonlyif body andtime werenecessary concomitants. The proof for this claim (defective though it may be) is now in. Al-Kindi therefore concludes that since (i) the body of the universe is finite, (ii) time By way of conclusion, then, it is clear that al-Kindi's philosophical doctrine of creation depends on his arguments for the body of the universe beginning to exist at some point in the finite past. Starting from six self-evident principles, al-Kindi is able to show (successfully, I think) that no body of actually infinite magnitude can exist, and thus that the body ofthe universe cannot be infinite. But his claim that the universe is, in addition, temporally finite, given that time is the duration of the body of the universe, was seen to follow only if body and time are necessary concomitants. The crucial premise required to prove this was that body cannot exist without motion. Unfortunately,the two supporting arguments for thispremise were found to be flawed in various respects. It seems to me, therefore, that alKindi's argument for the necessary concomitance of body and time, and therefore the inference to the temporal finitude of the universe (and ultimately its creation by God), is not justified. This is not to say, however, that al-Kindi has failed altogether to show that the universe began to exist at some point in the finite past. For he has at his disposal two other arguments for this conclusion: an argument from composition and an argument based on the impossibility of traversing an actual infinite; both of these seem very promising. Moreover, there is no reason to think that the argument based on body, motion, and time could not be revised so as to provide us with the desired conclusion. The door has not been shut on the Kindian arguments for the creation of the universe and the existence of a Creator; al-Kindi's efforts in this regard certainly warrant the critical attention of contemporary philosophers interested in these and related matters. 
